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General Data Protection Regulation 
a b s t r a c t 
Online search engines, social media platforms, and targeted advertising services often em- 
ploy a “data-driven” business model based on the large-scale collection, analysis, and mon- 
etization of personal data. When providing such services significant information asymme- 
tries arise: data-driven companies collect much more personal data than the consumer 
knows or can reasonably oversee, and data-driven companies have much more (technical) 
information about how this data is processed than consumers would be able to understand. 
This article demonstrates the vulnerable position consumers continue to find themselves 
in as a result of information asymmetries between them and data-driven companies. The 
GDPR, by itself, is in practice unable to mitigate these information asymmetries, nor would 
it be able to provide for effective transparency, since it does not account for the unique 
characteristics of the data-driven business model. Consumers are thus faced with an insur- 
mountable lack of transparency which is inherent in, as well as the inevitable consequence 
of, the magnitude of the information asymmetries present on the data-driven market. 
© 2020 Peter J. van de Waerdt. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. 








Due to continued improvements in the field of informa-
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ecome ‘data-driven’. While Google and Facebook are the 
ost prominent operators of a data-driven business model,
he combined weight of all of the smaller actors on the on- 
ine advertising market should not be underestimated ei- 
her. Data-drivenness has become ubiquitous on the Inter- 
et, and it is easy to see how it can be highly beneficial to 
he consumer: it allows various useful services to be provided 
or a low price and in a personalized manner. Despite such 
enefits, however, it is not completely without its costs or 
isks. 
In this article, the conduct of data-driven companies 
DDCs) on their respective online markets, as well as the con- 
equences thereof, will be examined from the perspective of 
nformation asymmetries. The term ‘information asymme- 
ries’ in this context refers to the substantial differences that 
xist between the information available to the DDCs versus 
hat available to the consumers themselves. Although infor- 
ation asymmetries are common in nearly all markets, and 
re therefore also a subject of consumer protection law, they 
re especially problematic on the data-driven market. On this 
arket there is asymmetry not only with regards to the con- 
ract but, crucially, also with regards to the volume and the 
anner of personal data processing. As a result, consumers 
nd themselves in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis DDCs. Seri- 
us risks arise that consumers will be unable to make well- 
nformed decisions about the use of their data, or to invoke 
heir rights. The usage of the term “information asymmetries”
hroughout this article should be understood in this full con- 
ext. 
While there is a wealth of literature in the field of data 
rotection recognizing information asymmetries as a signif- 
cant concern,3 there has not been an exhaustive examina- 
ion of how information asymmetries come into being and 
ow intertwined they are with the inner workings of data- 
riven markets. The full complexity of DDCs’ data process- 
ng, and how the resulting information asymmetries are in- 
erconnected with the difficulties of ensuring transparency on 
hese markets, has not been examined in detail. This article 
ims to provide such insight and in doing so illustrate why 
DCs present a unique challenge for European data protec- 
ion law. Indeed, the information asymmetries perspective is 
aluable because it vividly illustrates just how much of the 
ata collection, data analysis, profiling, and behavioral tar- 
eting process remains unknown, incomprehensible, or un- 
orkable to the average consumer. The volume and com- 
lexity of the data processing conducted by DDCs makes 3 For example: Bart Schermer, ‘Risks of Profiling and the Limits of 
ata Protection Law’ in Bart Custers and others (eds), Discrimina- 
ion and Privacy in the Information Society: Data Mining and Profiling in 
arge Databases (Springer 2013), p. 139 – 140.; Emre Bayamlioglu, 
Contesting Automated Decisions’ [2018] European Data Protec- 
ion Law Review (EDPL) 433, p. 435. M.H.C. Rhoen, Big Data, Big Risks, 
ig Power Shifts: Evaluating the General Data Protection Regulation as an 
nstrument of Risk Control and Power Redistributionin the Context of Big 
ata (Ridderprint 2019), p. 11 – 13. Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘Profiling: 
rom Data to Knowledge: The Challenges of a Crucial Technology’ 
2006) 30 Datenschutz und Datensicherheit - DuD 548, p. 551; via 
laude Castelluccia, ‘Behavioural Tracking on the Internet: A Tech- 
ical Perspective’ in Serge Gutwirth and others (eds), European Data 












or a unique source of substantial information asymmetries,
hich in turn puts up an immense wall to ensuring effective 
ransparency. 
Specifically, this article aims to answer the following ques- 
ions: How do information asymmetries between consumers 
nd DDCs arise; to what extent is the General Data Protection 
egulation (GDPR) of the European Union (EU) able to mitigate 
his discrepancy on the data-driven market; how are informa- 
ion asymmetries linked to lacking transparency; and to what 
xtent would ensuring effective transparency even be possi- 
le in light of the information asymmetries? The ties between 
nformation asymmetry and transparency are especially vi- 
al elements of this research, since effective transparency is 
 prerequisite for citizens to exercise their rights under the 
DPR. Lacking transparency because of information asymme- 
ry could result in consumers being unaware that their rights 
re being violated in the first place, or whom to address their 
oncerns to even if they do realize. 
To explain this in more detail this article will commence in 
ection 2 with a description of what the information asym- 
etries between DDCs and consumers are, as well as how 
hey arise over the course of providing a service. This will be 
ollowed in Section 3 with an explanation of how the GDPR 
ddresses these information asymmetries and to what ex- 
ent it succeeds in closing the gap between the citizen and 
DCs. Having discussed the existence of and response to in- 
ormation asymmetries on the data-driven market, Section 
 will then address the main argument of this article. Namely,
hat information asymmetry and transparency are integrally 
onnected, and that a push for greater transparency in itself 
ill not effectively mitigate the information asymmetries or 
trengthen the data protection of citizens on the data-driven 
arket.4 To do so, this section will explain the fundamen- 
al differences between DDCs and conventional companies 
n terms of data collection and profiling. Furthermore, it will 
xamine the ongoing development of explainable algorithms 
nd whether they can aid it mitigating information asymme- 
ries. Finally, this Section will delve into the close interrela- 
ion between information asymmetry, lacking transparency 
nd potential bias in algorithmic profiling activities, focusing 
n how these factors exacerbate one another. 
Thus, this article aims to provide a thorough overview of a 
pecific problem in data protection law, namely the effects of 
nformation asymmetries on the data-driven market. It does 
o by focusing on the GDPR; examining whether the GDPR in 
tself has the potential to mitigate this problem through stim- 
lating transparency or providing data subject rights. Obvi- 
usly there are other perspectives from which to examine this 
ssue as well: notably EU competition law and consumer pro- 
ection law, or indeed a combination of various fields of law.
obust long-term solutions to the problems inherent in far- 
eaching information asymmetries and dominant data-driven 
ompanies are expected to be varied, complex, and take ac- 
ount of many relevant areas of law. They are the subject 4 For the purposes of this article the term ‘citizen’ refers to cit- 
zens of the European Union, as they are the ones covered by the 
DPR. They are also referred to as the consumers of online ser- 
ices, users of online platforms, or as data subjects. 


















































of further research and as such are not dealt with in detail
here. 
2. How and why information asymmetries 
arise 
In order to understand how information asymmetries be-
tween consumers and DDCs arise, it must first be understood
how DDCs earn their revenue. While the data-driven market
is often popularly characterized as “selling personal data”,5 
this is not always accurate. Nevertheless, it is true that the
monetization of personal data is the primary source of in-
come for prominent DDCs such as Google and Facebook. This
is achieved by way of advertising, specifically targeted adver-
tising.6 For instance, Google has acquired its own advertis-
ing network in DoubleClick, which has ties to the majority of
the most visited websites in the world.7 Facebook, meanwhile,
serves ads on its social media platform and on Instagram but
focuses specifically on mobile advertising.8 
Targeted advertising, otherwise known as behavioral tar-
geting, is a method whereby DDCs analyze personal data in or-
der to determine the interests of an individual consumer and
show them advertisements which correspond to those inter-
ests.9 For example: if a user visits a website related to movies
and television shows the DDC will take note of this interest. It
can subsequently use this to display more advertisements for
the latest blockbusters. This method of advertising is efficient
because targeted ads lead to greater profitability than general-
ized ads: companies will simply waste fewer resources show-
ing ads to consumers who will never be interested in their
product.10 In essence, DDCs provide a service to advertisers.
A service to show their ads to those consumers most likely to5 For example: Hamish McRae, ‘Companies Have Been Sell- 
ing Our Data in Exchange for “Free” Products and Services 
for a Long Time – Facebook’s Not so Different’ ( The Indepen- 
dent , 7 April 2018) < https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/ 
facebook- data- scandal- free- products- sheryl- sandberg- a8294006. 
html > accessed 13 February 2019. 
6 In 2016, Facebook earned $26 billion of its $27 bil- 
lion total revenue with advertising.; ‘Facebook Reports 
Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2016 Results’ < https: 
//investor.fb.com/investor-news/press- release- details/2017/ 
facebook- Reports- Fourth- Quarter- and- Full- Year- 2016- Results/ 
default.aspx > accessed 29 June 2017.; Google over that same 
year earned $79 billion of its total $89 billion through adver- 
tising. ‘Alphabet Annual Report’ < https://abc.xyz/investor/pdf/ 
2016 _ google _ annual _ report.pdf> accessed 6 February 2017. p. 22. 
7 ‘Onderzoek CBP Naar Het Combineren van Persoons- 
gegevens Door Google’ < https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens. 
nl/sites/default/files/downloads/mijn _ privacy/rap _ 
2013- google- privacybeleid.pdf> accessed 12 April 2017, p. 12. 
8 ‘Mobile Advertising Drives Strong Facebook Quarter’ ( USA 
TODAY ) < https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/02/ 
01/facebook- earnings- fourth- quarter- 2016- beat/97340988/ > 
accessed 29 June 2017. 
9 Lillian Wallace, Hidden Hazards of Online Advertising : An Investi- 
gation of Consumer Security and Data Privacy Protection (Nova Science 
Publishers 2014), p. 14, 22 – 23. 
10 Ganesh Iyer, David Soberman and J Miguel Villas-Boas, ‘The 








be interested in them.11 Put differently, DDCs rent out adver-
tising space, as well as the attention of Internet users, to the
advertisers.12 
Since the main source of revenue for DDCs, targeted adver-
tising, is based predominantly on the collection and analysis
of personal data, information asymmetries can quickly mate-
rialize. The information asymmetries that arise from this can
be divided into two categories: those which arise from per-
sonal data collection, and those which arise from personal
data analysis. 
2.1. Information asymmetries from personal data 
collectio n 
Information asymmetries start to arise from the moment the
actual collection of personal data takes place. In particular,
DDCs amass personal data through methods and in quanti-
ties that the consumer cannot oversee or control. There are a
number of ways in which this occurs. 
Firstly, DDCs do not only collect data actively and know-
ingly provided by the user. They also amass data “observed”
from the consumer’s usage of the social media platform,
search engine or other online service which they provide.13
DDCs collect and store data points based on every action the
user takes on the platform or while using the service. For ex-
ample, commenting on a photo of kittens is simultaneously
the ordinary use-case of a social media platform as well as a
data point for the service provider. By signaling to his friends
that he likes cats, the user is unconsciously doing the same
for the DDC in question.14 In the case of search engines the
process of data collection is even more vast: all of the users’
search queries can be collected, combined, stored in a per-
sonal profile, and subsequently used for targeting.15 
There are even scenarios in which users provide informa-
tion to certain DDCs merely by checking into their account,
such as the collection of IP-addresses or geolocation data.16 If
geolocation tracking has not been disabled, or if the user does
not realize that her uploaded photos and videos contain ge-
olocation data, a DDC can collect information on where a spe-
cific account is currently being accessed from.17 If the service11 This is known as operating on a dual-sided market. Online ser- 
vices such as social media platforms simultaneously offer differ- 
ent services to two groups of market participants: a free platform 
to consumers, and an advertising service to advertisers. 
12 Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Improving Privacy Protection in the 
Area of Behavioural Targeting (UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Reposi- 
tory) 2014), p. 71. 
13 ‘Guidelines on the Right to Data Portability’ < http: 
//ec.europa.eu/information _ society/newsroom/image/document/ 
2016-51/wp242 _ en _ 40852.pdf> accessed 17 February 2017, p. 8 –
9. 
14 Arnold Roosendaal, ‘We Are All Connected to Facebook...by 
Facebook!’ in Serge Gutwirth and others (eds), European Data Pro- 
tection: In Good Health? (Springer 2012), p. 4 – 5. 
15 Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius (n 12), p. 55 – 56. 
16 Bo Liu and others, Location Privacy in Mobile Applications 
(Springer Singapore 2018) < http://link.springer.com/10.1007/ 
978- 981- 13- 1705- 7 > accessed 13 November 2019, p. 34 – 35. 
17 Sangmee Lee, Ki Joon Kim and S Shyam Sundar, ‘Customization 
in Location-Based Advertising: Effects of Tailoring Source, Loca- 
tional Congruity, and Product Involvement on Ad Attitudes’ (2015) 















































































27 Claude Castelluccia (n 3). p. 26; Federal Trade Commis- 
sion, ‘Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change’ 
< https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ s being used on a smartphone this could, in the extreme, al- 
ow the service provider to compose a map of the user’s daily 
outine.18 
In addition to provided personal data and observed per- 
onal data, DDCs can bolster a personal dataset through other 
eans. Facebook is able to cross-reference information pro- 
ided by a user’s friends and include it in the dataset,19 and 
t can collect personal data on third-party websites through 
ts widespread Like button.20 This practice of combining per- 
onal data from across different Facebook services, includ- 
ng subsidiaries such as the image hosting platform Insta- 
ram and the Virtual Reality platform Oculus, was the subject 
f the much-discussed Bundeskartellamt case against Face- 
ook.21 The Bundeskartellamt held that Facebook had not ob- 
ained valid consent for these data collection practices, as it 
ad made the use of the main Facebook social media platform 
onditional on consenting to the full range of subsidiary data 
ollection practices.22 
Furthermore, in 2019 the United States Federal Trade Com- 
ission (FTC) brought an action against Facebook. In it, the 
TC alleged that Facebook allowed third party developers to 
ccess not only the personal data of users who had consented 
o having their data collected, but also to the data of all of 
hose users’ Facebook friends.23 This included the collection 
f interest data, video activity, and even website URL history 
ata,24 all without the consent of the affected friends.25 While 
sers were theoretically able to prevent their friends from con- 
enting on their behalf, few Facebook users were aware this 
ractice even existed. Fewer still were able to find the, unhelp- 
ully labeled, applicable setting.26 In short, there are worrying 
xamples of DDCs collecting large quantities of personal data 
ithout the knowledge or consent of the data subject. 
The above are all examples of data collection by compa- 
ies which provide a service directly to the consumer. How- 1 Computers in Human Behavior 336.; Claude Castelluccia (n 4), 
. 26. 
18 Claude Castelluccia (n 3), p. 26.; Joseph Turow, The Daily You: 
ow the New Advertising Industry Is Defining Your Identity and Your 
orth (Yale University Press 2011), p. 150 – 151. Liu and others (n 
6), p. 36. 
19 ‘Onderzoek Naar Het Verwerken van Persoonsgegevens 
an Betrokkenen in Nederland Door Het Facebook-Concern’ 
 https://autoriteitersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/ 
les/onderzoek _ facebook.pdf> , p. 22. 
20 Arnold Roosendaal (n 14), p. 4 – 5. 
21 Bundeskartellamt, 6th Decision Division, ‘Administrative Pro- 
eedings Decision under Section 32(1) German Competition Act 
GWB), Facebook Inc. i.a. - The Use of Abusive Business Terms 
ursuant to Section 19 (1) GWB’. ‘Bundeskartellamt Prohibits Face- 
ook from Combining User Data from Different Sources: Back- 
round Information on the Bundeskartellamt’s Facebook Proceed- 
ng’ < https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/ 
N/Pressemitteilungen/2019/07 _ 02 _ 2019 _ Facebook _ FAQs.pdf? 
 _ blob=publicationFile&v=6 > accessed 13 February 2019. 
22 Bundeskartellamt, 6th Decision Division (n 21), paras. 522, 564, 
01 – 603. 
23 United States of America v Facebook, Inc [2019] United States Dis- 
rict Court, District of Columbia Case No. 19-cv-2184, Document 
. 
24 ibid., para. 23. 
25 ibid., para. 22. 























ver, not all DDCs are service providers to European citizens: 
ome do not require any open interaction with the consumer,
et are still able to collect a wealth of personal data. Ad- 
ertising networks are the most prominent example of this 
henomenon.27 Ad networks are DDCs which offer advertise- 
ents to the Internet user on behalf of the host website she 
isits. When a user visits a website that has outsourced its 
dvertisements to an ad network, her browser receives the in- 
truction to contact that ad network.28 Along with the adver- 
isement the ad network will also send a cookie to be placed on
he user’s computer.29 The ad network is then able to collect 
he user’s personal data across every website on which it deliv- 
rs its ads by using its own cookie to identify the user.30 In par-
icular, the ad network can read and store the web addresses 
URLs) from which the user’s browser requests its ads.31 Over 
ime the ad network will use this information to create a be- 
avioral profile. As a user visits more different websites, enters 
ew search queries, or offers up data points in other ways, her 
rofile becomes more detailed: she may be categorized by age,
ocation, income level, and a plethora of other factors.32 
When compared to the other more overt forms of data col- 
ection, consumers are unlikely to be aware that their infor- 
ation is being collected by the websites they visit, much less 
hat these ad networks also do so.33 Nevertheless, ad networks 
re ubiquitous on the Internet: even in 2013 Google’s adver- 
ising network was already operating on 70% of websites.34 
hile Google’s advertising network is the largest and most 
ecognized, ad networks are in fact run by a mass of DDCs 
hich are unfamiliar to most consumers.35 They deliver their ederal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy- 
ra-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf> 
ccessed 23 August 2018, p. 68. 
28 Lillian Wallace (n 9), p. 15. 
29 This is known as a “third-party cookie” since it is embedded 
n the host website but belongs to a different company altogether. 
ontrast this with first-party cookies, which are used by the web- 
ite operator to ensure that the site works smoothly, remembers 
sers’ preferences, and allows for the use of the “cart” functional- 
ty of webshops. 
30 Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius (n 12), p. 40. 
31 ibid. 
32 Ibid. p. 56 – 60.; J. Gerards and R. Nehmelman, Algoritmes En 
rondrechten (Boom Juridisch 2018). p. 20 – 22. 
33 FTC Staff Report, ‘Self-Regulatory Principles For Online Be- 
avioral Advertising’ < https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
ocuments/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-self- 
egulatory- principles- online- behavioral- advertising/ 
085400behavadreport.pdf> accessed 29 March 2019. p. 26 –
7; via Joseph Turow (n 18), p. 175. 
34 Steven Englehardt and Arvind Narayanan, ‘Online Track- 
ng: A 1-Million-Site Measurement and Analysis’ < http: 
/randomwalker.info/publications/OpenWPM _ 1 _ million _ site _ 
racking _ measurement.pdf> accessed 29 May 2017, p. 8. 
35 Jeff Chester, ‘Cookie Wars: How New Data Profiling and Target- 
ng Techniques Threaten Citizens and Consumers in the “Big Data”
ra’ in Serge Gutwirth and others (eds), European Data Protection: In 
ood Health? (Springer 2012), p. 60 – 63.; Maurits Martijn and Dim- 
tri Tokmetzis, Je Hebt Wél Iets Te Verbergen: Over Het Levensbelang 
an Privacy (De Correspondent 2018). p. 188. 












































































cookies through virtually invisible means, such as a single
pixel on the host website.36 
Additionally, ad networks also enter into contracts with
one another on a vast scale, distributing personal data
amongst themselves in order to bring new individual users
into their personal data network or improve the datasets they
already have available.37 Research by Junqué de Fortuny et al.
suggests that, in terms of accuracy and predictive modeling, it
is indeed worthwhile for smaller DDCs to broaden and deepen
their datasets by pooling their data.38 Companies have also
emerged to offer complementary services, such as matching
different companies’ cookies to the same user, additional data
analytics, or data brokering.39 
Taken together, all of these companies and networks are
engaged in a complicated tangle of contracts, subcontracts,
and partnering networks.40 Van Eijk charted all of these net-
works and their interconnections, using Denmark as a case
study, and found hundreds of different companies contract-
ing amongst each other.41 Similarly, one estimate held that
the average Dutch citizen is already included in hundreds of
different databases across many different actors.42 Due to the
complexity and fragmentation of the data-driven market, the
flows of personal data are nearly impossible for the average
citizen to oversee. A consumer thus cannot realistically super-
vise or make decisions as to which companies have collected
what type of information on him, how much, and what they
have learned from analyzing it. In the foreseeable future even
more data flows are expected to materialize from even more
companies, as an increasing number and range of varied de-
vices become connected to the Internet. It would go beyond
the scope of this article to examine these Internet of Things
data flows in detail, but suffice it to say that adding those to
the vast data collection which already exists will increase the
level of complexity further still. 
Even when a consumer takes active steps to prevent data
collection by third parties, such as by installing browser ex-
tensions which block cookies, it is not guaranteed that his per-
sonal data will not be collected. Other means to identify indi-
vidual users also exist: device fingerprinting is one such tech-
nique. In this process a computer is recognized by the combi-
nation of its browser settings, operating system, installed add-
ons, and other features. Taken together, these form a pattern
that is almost certainly unique to an individual.43 Google itself36 Lillian Wallace (n 9), p. 14.; Joseph Turow (n 18), p. 60 – 61. 
37 Robbert J. van Eijk, Web Privacy Measurement in Real-Time Bid- 
ding Systems A Graph-Based Approach to RTB System Classification (Ip- 
skamp Printing 2019), p. 152. 
38 Enric Junqué de Fortuny, David Martens and Foster Provost, 
‘Predictive Modeling With Big Data: Is Bigger Really Better?’ (2013) 
1 Big Data 215, p. 223. 
39 Lillian Wallace (n 9), p. 25. 
40 Robbert J. van Eijk (n 37), p. 152, 266 – 273. 
41 ibid., p. 266 – 268. 
42 J. Gerards and R. Nehmelman (n 32), p. 124. 
43 Bernard Marr, ‘How Businesses Can Use Device Fingerprinting 
To Identify And Track Customers’ ( Forbes ) < https://www.forbes. 
com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/06/23/how- businesses- use- 
controversial- device- fingerprinting- to- identify- and- track- 
customers/ > accessed 29 March 2019.; Claude Castelluccia (n 





was fined by the FTC for using a workaround which it used to
continue placing cookies by circumventing browser settings
designed to prevent it from doing so.44 
Ultimately, at a fundamental level consumers lack an in-
sight into how DDCs collect their personal data and how com-
prehensive this collection can be. Information asymmetries
between consumers and companies arise both in terms of the
volume and the means of data collection: much more data is
being amassed than the consumer can reasonably oversee, by
an exorbitant amount of interconnected parties, through a va-
riety of means which are far from self-evident. 
2.2. Information asymmetries from personal Data 
Analysis 
In addition to the many ways in which personal data is col-
lected from the user, DDCs also have other means of amassing
information. Besides data that was actively shared by the con-
sumer or data obtained through observing his actions, there
exists “inferred” data: personal data acquired through data
analysis.45 Data analysis, also known as data mining, is par-
ticularly significant in terms of information asymmetries be-
cause it can be used to gather personal data without the user’s
continuous involvement. 
Data analysis aims to find correlations between interests
and attributes, and establishes predictive indicators related to
the user in order to achieve this aim. The precise function-
ing of data mining is intricate and employs many different
methods of analysis, such as clustering data into groups based
on similarity, or classifying new data points into predefined
categories.46 In essence, however, all data analysis works by
extrapolating the information which the DDC has previously
collected on the totality of its users. Fundamentally, the algo-
rithm studies group dynamics: if many users born before 1985
have a known interest in visiting museums and subsequently
click on URLs related to classical music, this reveals a num-
ber of data points.47 There is an indication that interests in
museums and classical music are related and users over the
age of thirty-five are more likely to be interested in those pas-
times. Once a new user enters into the DDC’s personal data
network and exhibits one of these attributes, the algorithm
will use this and other factors to determine the likelihood that
she will also exhibit the other associated attributes.48 Group
information is thus used to determine that a person with cer-
tain attributes is likely to also have other specific attributes on
the basis that many other users also share this combination of44 Lillian Wallace (n 9), p. 15. 
45 ‘Guidelines on the Right to Data Portability’ (n 13), p. 8. 
46 Toon Calders and Bart Custers, ‘What Is Data Mining and How 
Does It Work?’ in Bart Custers and others (eds), Discrimination and 
Privacy in the Information Society: Data Mining and Profiling in Large 
Databases (Springer 2013), p. 31 – 38. 
47 Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius (n 12), p. 65 – 70. 
48 ibid., p. 68 – 70. Note that data analysis always results in a cer- 
tain percentage chance that a user will have a certain trait. For ex- 
ample, someone interested in museums could be 85% likely to also 
enjoy classical music. While it is virtually impossible to achieve 
complete certainty simply because every individual is unique, pro- 
ficient algorithms can come sufficiently close to make targeting 
advertisements based on the findings viable. 





















































































i  raits.49 The data analysis that DDCs perform is based around 
illions of such correlations. As a result, DDCs obtain new per- 
onal data about individuals on their own accord: a consumer 
ho directly provides a social media platform with five differ- 
nt data points about herself may in fact be providing many 
ore indirectly, including potentially sensitive ones.50 An es- 
imate by the European Data Protection Supervisor held that 
ajor DDCs are able to profile their users based on as many 
s 52.000 different attributes.51 
The algorithms which perform data analysis are expected 
o improve further in the future, making their inferences more 
ccurate as well as more expansive: the analysis will be both 
roader and deeper. For example, it is not a great leap of logic 
o determine that computer enthusiasts are often also inter- 
sted in video games and vice versa ; this can already be done 
resently. However, it may also be the case that computer en- 
husiasts tend to prefer specific clothing styles, music, food 
nd drink, or news sources, even though such behavior has 
ot been observed thus far. As algorithms improve, such rela- 
ions as well as even more distant ones could be established 
ith increasing accuracy and subsequently used for advertis- 
ng purposes. Scaling up the data collection to serve as new 
nputs will aid this development even further.52 
Technological means have also made it increasingly feasi- 
le to further analyze data subjects psychologically; to know 
he character of the user in detail.53 There is a significant 
mount of research regarding how many different kinds of in- 
ormation can be used to infer psychological traits of individ- 
als. For example, research by Reese and Danforth found that 
he images a user posts on Instagram can reveal the likelihood 
hat they suffer from depression.54 Their study suggests that 
epressed persons are more inclined to post pictures in black- 
nd-white and share fewer group photos.55 Similarly, the lan- 
uage a person employs in their Facebook posts can reveal 
heir mental wellbeing through a broad program of “senti- 
ent analysis”.56 These results do not have to be based on 49 Toon Calders and Bart Custers (n 46), p. 31. 
50 Nancy J King and Jay Forder, ‘Data Analytics and Consumer Pro- 
ling: Finding Appropriate Privacy Principles for Discovered Data’ 
2016) 32 Computer Law & Security Review 696, p. 699 – 700. 
51 Giovanni Buttarelli, ‘Opinion 3/2018 on Online Manipula- 
ion and Personal Data’ < https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/ 
ublication/18- 03- 19 _ online _ manipulation _ en.pdf> accessed 7 
arch 2019, p. 8. 
52 Junqué de Fortuny, Martens and Provost (n 38), p. 224. 
53 Sandra C Matz and Oded Netzer, ‘Using Big Data as a Window 
nto Consumers’ Psychology’ (2017) 18 Current Opinion in Behav- 
oral Sciences 7, p. 8. 
54 Andrew G Reece and Christopher M Danforth, ‘Insta- 
ram Photos Reveal Predictive Markers of Depression’ [2016] 
rXiv:1608.03282 [physics] < http://arxiv.org/abs/1608.03282 > 
ccessed 23 May 2017. 
55 ibid. Note that algorithms can only determine correlation, not 
ausation. It is unknown if an individual posts fewer group pho- 
os because he is depressed, or if he is depressed because he has 
ew friends with whom to take group photos. Algorithms merely 
ecognize a relation between two data points. 
56 Johannes C Eichstaedt and others, ‘Facebook Language Pre- 
icts Depression in Medical Records’ (2018) 115 Proceedings of the 
ational Academy of Sciences 11203; Zeynep Tufekci, ‘Opinion | 






















vert data points that directly reveal sensitive details: suffi- 
iently advanced algorithms can make such deductions even 
ased on seemingly innocent data. One study, in which Face- 
ook Likes were used to accurately predict individuals’ sex- 
al orientation, found that, for unclear reasons, within the re- 
iewed study group a liking of Britney Spears was moderately 
ndicative of homosexuality.57 A later study found that under 
ome circumstances personality determinations made by al- 
orithms can be more accurate than those made by human 
eings.58 
Such information about an individual’s inner world can be 
ighly valuable for the purposes of advertising. Knowing an 
ndividual’s personality traits means that a company can cre- 
te and show ads designed to appeal to their set of values.59 
 highly introverted person may not be convinced by a smart- 
hone ad which emphasizes how popular the product already 
s, but he may be receptive to an ad emphasizing the smart- 
hone’s options for personalization. Research has shown that 
onsumers respond positively to products, brands and mar- 
eting messages that represent the same values he or she 
olds.60 Additionally, by tracking and analyzing how a user 
rowses through an online storefront, algorithms can learn 
ow she behaves during her personal decision-making pro- 
ess and therefore how best to appeal to her in that critical 
oment. DDCs therefore have an incentive to bolster their 
atasets through ever deeper levels of analysis. 
All of the above serves to illustrate that the information 
symmetries which arise from the collection of personal data 
y DDCs are magnified greatly through the use of data min- 
ng. Having previously collected a set of personal data from 
he consumer, data analysis is used to expand and enrich the 
ataset without requiring further involvement or knowledge 
f the data subject. The personal information obtained in this 
anner can be highly sensitive and detailed. Although it is 
urrently unclear to what extent practices such as psycholog- 
cal profiling are being used for targeted advertising purposes,
he fact remains that such information is readily available to 
 number of major DDCs. Indeed, the very fact that it is un-
nown how extensively and to what level of detail users are 
eing profiled is indicative of the information asymmetries 
n the data-driven market. Ultimately, DDCs can attain ever 
ore personal data through data analysis while costumers are 26 April 2019) < https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/21/opinion/ 
omputational-inference.html > accessed 8 May 2019.; Darren 
avidson, ‘Facebook Targets “insecure” Young People’ The Aus- 
ralian (1 May 2017). 
57 M Kosinski, D Stillwell and T Graepel, ‘Private Traits and At- 
ributes Are Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior’ 
2013) 110 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 5802, 
. 5804 – 5805.; For one possible explanation on how such an 
utcome might occur even if the two data points seem com- 
letely unrelated, see: Jennifer Golbeck, Your Social Media ‘Likes’ 
xpose More than You Think (2013) < https://www.ted.com/talks/ 
ennifer _ golbeck _ the _ curly _ fry _ conundrum _ why _ social _ media _ 
ikes _ say _ more _ than _ you _ might _ think > accessed 14 March 2019. 
58 Wu Youyou, Michal Kosinski and David Stillwell, ‘Computer- 
ased Personality Judgments Are More Accurate than Those Made 
y Humans’ (2015) 112 Proceedings of the National Academy of 
ciences 1036. 
59 Maurits Martijn and Dimitri Tokmetzis (n 35), p. 134 – 135. 
60 Matz and Netzer (n 53), p. 9. 




































































unable to assess if or to what extent this is happening, what
new data points have been found, how such a conclusion was
reached, and what effects it will have on their Internet expe-
rience in general or the ads they are being served specifically.
3. GDPR approach to information 
asymmetries 
In the foregoing Section it was discussed how information
asymmetries between consumers and DDCs form. With the
General Data Protection Regulation, the EU legislator has en-
deavored to protect the personal data rights of its citizens
as one of its primary goals.61 The question then presents it-
self whether the GDPR succeeds in mitigating the information
asymmetries on the data-driven market. Does it in fact ensure
that consumers can make informed decisions about their on-
line data? This Section will focus on a few facets of the GDPR
in detail: the information rights of data subjects, the restric-
tions on profiling, and the requirements of consent. 
3.1. Information rights and obligations 
Chapter III, subsection 2 of the GDPR is entirely devoted to the
information that should be provided to data subjects 62 as well
as the rights that have been granted to them to access the per-
sonal data being processed. 
First and foremost, any data controller 63 must provide the
data subject with a significant amount of specific informa-
tion when processing their personal data. Arts. 13 and 14
GDPR mandate that information relating to the processor’s
own identity, the purposes and legal bases of the processing,
any third-party recipients of the data, the data subject’s GDPR
rights, and a great deal more must be provided.64 The same
obligations also apply if a DDC places a cookie on the data sub-
ject’s device.65 If the data processing activities also involve au-
tomated decision-making or profiling, the obligation to inform
the consumer intensifies further. The data subjects must be
informed of the fact that profiling will be used and they must
be granted an insight into the “logic” behind the profiling.66 To61 However, it is equally meant to “ensure the free flow of personal 
data between Member States”. ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the Eu- 
ropean Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Natural 
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data’ (n 2), Preamble para. 3. 
62 In the terminology of the GDPR, ‘data subject’ means “the iden- 
tified or identifiable natural person” to whom the personal data in 
question relates. ibid., art. 4(1). For the purposes of this article data 
subjects are consumers, namely the users of data-driven services. 
63 In the terminology of the GDPR, ‘data controller’ means “the 
natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body 
which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and 
means of the processing of personal data”. ibid., art. 4(7). For the 
purposes of this article data controllers are the DDCs. 
64 ibid., arts. 13 – 14. 
65 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data 
and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications 
sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) 2002 
[Official Journal L 201 , 31/07/2002], art. 5(f). 
66 ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to 
 
complement this obligation to inform, the EU legislator also
introduced a right to receive or access the personal data perti-
nent to the data subject. Pursuant to art. 15 GDPR consumers
have the right to request insight into the data regarding them
which the data controller processes.67 In practice these provi-
sions have been implemented in a variety of ways: Facebook
allows users to download an archive file containing their per-
sonal data,68 while Google gives users the option to view and
edit their own behavioral profile,69 as well as a full feed of their
activity with Google services.70 
However, even with all of these information rights it will
still be difficult for the consumer to attain a working knowl-
edge of the data being processed. As was discussed in Section
2 , These difficulties arise from the first moment of interac-
tion. Of the dozens of companies that are involved in the
complete web of the targeted advertising market very few ac-
tively present themselves to the consumer.71 More commonly
the consumer is asked by the host website for consent to
place third-party cookies, leading to a situation in which many
third-party cookies can be placed based on a single website
visit.72 Consequently, few consumers even realize that ad net-
works collect personal data. Fewer still know which specific
companies are involved or the complex structure in which it
takes place.73 Besides lacking the required information on the
front-end this also makes it especially problematic for data
subjects to effectively invoke their right to access: in order
to file a request for access the consumer must obviously first
know which company to address. In the case of large DDCs
such as Facebook and Google this is relatively easy to do, but
in the market of advertising networks this is manifestly more
challenging. 
Should the consumer nonetheless succeed in directing his
request to the correct data controller it is far from guaranteed
that he will receive all of the information that he needs to form
a complete image of the data processing that occurs. For ex-
ample, Google allows its users to access their own interest pro-
file, but research has shown that these are often incomplete.
Research by Datta et al. showed that a (fictional) user who vis-
ited many websites related to rehabilitation from addiction re-
ceived ads for rehabilitation clinics even though rehabilitationthe Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data’ (n 2), arts. 13(2)f, 14(2)f. 
67 ibid., art. 15. 
68 Facebook, ‘Your Facebook Information’ < https://www. 
facebook.com/settings?tab=your _ facebook _ information > ac- 
cessed 21 February 2019. (Facebook account and log-in required.) 
69 Google, ‘Ad Settings’ < https://adssettings.google.com/ 
authenticated > accessed 21 February 2019. (Google account 
and log-in required.) 
70 Google, ‘My Activity’ < https://myactivity.google.com/?hl= 
en&utm _ source=google-account&utm _ medium=web > accessed 
21 February 2019. (Google account and log-in required.) 
71 José Estrada-Jiménez and others, ‘Online Advertising: Analy- 
sis of Privacy Threats and Protection Approaches’ (2017) 100 Com- 
puter Communications 32, p. 38. 
72 Ibrahim Altaweel, Nathan Good and Chris Jay Hoofnagle, ‘Web 
Privacy Census’ < https://ssrn.com/abstract=2703814 > accessed 29 
March 2019.; via Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius (n 12), p. 54. 
73 Estrada-Jiménez and others (n 71), p. 39 – 40.; Frederik 
Zuiderveen Borgesius (n 12), p. 62. 























































































as not displayed in the accessible profile.74 There is thus rea- 
on to believe that behavioral profiles are much broader and 
ore detailed than what the consumer is shown when she 
mploys her right to access.75 The same is true for Facebook: 
hile it claims not to use medical information for its targeted 
dvertising and does not show this data in access requests, an 
nvestigation by the Dutch data protection authority revealed 
t least one example of a woman who had been subjected to 
uch targeting.76 This casts serious doubts on whether DDCs 
re GDPR-compliant in providing full insight into the data they 
old on their users. Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult to ver- 
fy whether full insight has actually been granted, since there 
re no practical methods to check if all data has been pro- 
ided. The only option would be to painstakingly examine all 
f the ads being served and compare them to the provided 
ata: a time-consuming and imperfect method at best. Bar- 
ing investigations by data protection authorities, consumers 
hemselves cannot know whether or not they have received 
ll the relevant data in accordance with the GDPR. 
Although the GDPR has a robust framework of information 
bligations to be met by a data controller, it also contains pro- 
isions that allow a data controller to escape some of these 
bligations. The most pressing of these is art. 11 GDPR: “Pro- 
essing which does not require identification”.77 This article 
oncerns the practice of pseudonymization as well as other 
ituations in which it is no longer necessary for a data con- 
roller to be able to identify a data subject.78 If the data con- 
roller has tied its data relating to a certain individual to a 
seudonym in such a way that it is no longer able to iden- 
ify this person, it does not have to maintain additional in- 
ormation for the sole purpose of complying with its informa- 
ion obligations.79 A consumer making use of her access rights 
ould need to demonstrate that the data in question concerns 
er in order for her information rights to be restored.80 In ef- 74 Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz and Anupam Datta, 
Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings’ (2015) 
015 Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
 http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/popets.2015.1.issue-1/ 
opets- 2015- 0007/popets- 2015- 0007.xml > accessed 14 March 
017, p. 103 – 104. 
75 ibid. 
76 ‘Onderzoek Naar Het Verwerken van Persoonsgegevens van Be- 
rokkenen in Nederland Door Het Facebook-Concern’ (n 19), p. 81 
82. 
77 ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of 
he Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to 
he Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
ata’ (n 2), art. 11. 
78 Runshan Hu and others, ‘Bridging Policy, Regulation and Prac- 
ice? A Techno-Legal Analysis of Three Types of Data in the GDPR’ 
n Ronald Leenes, Rosamunde Van Brakel and Serge Gutwirth (eds), 
ata protection and privacy: the age of intelligent machines (Hart Pub- 
ishing 2017), p. 120 – 121. Arnoud Engelfriet, Lisette Meij and Peter 
ager, De Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming : Artikelsgewijs 
ommentaar (Ius Mentis 2017), p. 60. 
79 Arnoud Engelfriet, Lisette Meij and Peter Kager (n 78), p. 
0; Gabe Maldoff, ‘Top 10 Operational Impacts of the GDPR: 
art 8 - Pseudonymization’ < https://iapp.org/news/a/top-10- 
perational- impacts- of- the- gdpr- part- 8- pseudonymization/ > 
ccessed 7 August 2018. 
80 ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of 






















ect, the data controller can use robust pseudonymization in 
rder to avoid having to provide all of the necessary informa- 
ion as required by Chapter III, Section 2 GDPR. Merely remov- 
ng all direct identifiers, such as the user’s name, will not be 
ufficient: the DDC will also have to ensure that the combi- 
ation of all available data points does not allow it to single 
ut this individual.81 As more data is collected this require- 
ent will make it increasingly difficult to rely on art. 11 GDPR.
owever, for smaller advertising networks lower in the food 
hain this may still be a valid option, making it difficult for 
ata subjects to access their data which has been collected by 
hese companies. 
Furthermore, the above scenarios are all based on the infor- 
ation that must be provided by, or can be requested from, a 
ingle data controller. Yet it must be recognized that the data- 
riven market for targeted advertising is characterized by a 
arge number of competing and cooperating DDCs. As a re- 
ult, the personal data on any one individual is widely spread 
ut. Some information may be available to several companies 
ecause they all placed a cookie through the same website,
hereas other data is only stored by a single DDC after it was
ound through analysis. In order to get a complete picture of 
ne’s online data footprint the data subject must somehow 
anage to identify, be informed by, and invoke their rights vis- 
-vis potentially hundreds of different companies at the same 
ime.82 In practice, this is hardly a realistic scenario.83 
More fundamentally, even if the data subject does receive 
ll of the necessary data required by the GDPR she will still lack
n essential piece of information. Namely: how exactly did her 
licks and search queries lead to the ads being shown? To a 
ertain extent an answer to this question is already required 
y the GDPR: meaningful information about the logic involved 
n the process of profiling must be provided to the consumer.
owever, the GPDR is unclear on how detailed this logic must 
e to comply with Arts. 13(2)f and 14(2)f. After all, there is a
orld of difference between providing the consumer with the 
omplete algorithms that carry out the profiling activities, or 
t the other extreme to merely tell the consumer such algo- 
ithms exist. As Kamarinou et. al observe: “does the term ‘logic’ 
efer to the data set used to train the algorithm, or to the way the
lgorithm itself works in general, for example the mathematical / 
tatistical theories on which the design of the algorithm is based, or 
o the way the learned model worked in the particular instance when 
rocessing the data subject’s personal data?”84 
While data subjects do have the right to access information 
egarding the logic behind behavioral targeting, it is highly un- 
ikely that complete information on this matter could possibly 
e given to the consumer in an understandable and mean- 
ngful way. Algorithms used by DDCs for their targeted adver- he Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
ata’ (n 2), art. 11(2).; Arnoud Engelfriet, Lisette Meij and Peter 
ager (n 78), p. 60. 
81 Runshan Hu and others (n 78), p. 128 – 129. 
82 Robbert J. van Eijk (n 37), p. 266 – 267. 
83 Maurits Martijn and Dimitri Tokmetzis (n 35), p. 43 – 44. 
84 Dimitra Kamarinou, Christopher Millard and Jatinder Singh, 
Machine Learning with Personal Data’ in Ronald Leenes, 
osamunde Van Brakel and Serge Gutwirth (eds), Data protection 
nd privacy: the age of intelligent machines (Hart Publishing 2017), p. 
07. 














































































90 ibid., art. 22; H Kranenborg and LFM Verhey, De Algemene Veror- tising will certainly be incomprehensible to the average con-
sumer and even the more experienced and tech-savvy con-
sumers would still find them difficult to understand.85 Indeed,
the Article 29 Working Party has clarified that there is no obli-
gation on data controllers to provide “a complex explanation
of the algorithms used or disclosure of the full algorithm”.86 
Conversely, the Working Party also states that complexity is
not in itself an excuse for failing to provide meaningful infor-
mation.87 
The information asymmetries that arise from profiling
thus expose an inherent difficulty with the information obli-
gations in the GDPR. The GDPR appears to ask for a difficult, if
not impossible, balance between transparency and detail. On
the one hand, a controller is obliged to provide the consumer
with a wealth of information, especially if she makes use of
her right to access her personal data.88 On the other hand, the
data controller is also obliged to provide all of this information
in an understandable and legible manner.89 However, provid-
ing more information and, in particular, more detailed infor-
mation will also make it harder for consumers to understand.
Even if the information is framed in a legible and simple way
it will remain virtually impossible for a consumer to derive
any actual meaning from having access to all of their Google
search queries, previously watched Youtube videos, Google
Maps locations, and all of the other data points which Google
processes. In effect, a data controller can overload a consumer
with data, essentially reducing transparency by increasing in-
formation. As a result, the data subject will still be unable to
determine which actions or which data points led to him be-
ing placed in a certain category for the purposes of targeted
advertising. 
Ultimately, while the GDPR contains a number of measures
intended to ensure that the consumer is fully informed re-
garding any data processing that might take place for targeted
advertising purposes, these measures are difficult to effec-
tively invoke in practice and will not on their own solve the in-
formation asymmetries on the data-driven market. The GDPR
also leaves a pointed catch-22: by requiring DDCs to give the
consumer more information about the processing activities it
will also make it increasingly time-consuming and complex
for consumers to achieve a comprehensive understanding of
the dataset. On balance the information asymmetries and the
ability of consumers to make informed decisions will there-
fore broadly remain the same. 85 J. Gerards and R. Nehmelman (n 32), p. 49. 
86 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Automated Individual 
Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 
2016/679’ < https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/document. 
cfm?action=display&doc _ id=49826 > accessed 28 February 2019, 
p. 25. 
87 ibid. 
88 ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data’ (n 2), arts. 13 – 15. 
89 ibid., art. 12. 3.2. Profiling and automated decision-making 
As has been discussed in Section 2 , the information asymme-
tries in the data-driven market primarily arise over the course
and for the purpose of behavioral targeting: the creation of
personal interest profiles. As such, it is noteworthy that the
GDPR also has a number of provisions specifically regulating
profiling. 
Art. 22 GDPR establishes the right not to be subjected to de-
cisions based solely on automated decision-making, if those
decisions produce legal effects or similarly significantly affect
the data subject.90 While this provision is phrased as a right
for the data subject, it is interpreted as a prohibition imposed
on the data controller.91 For the purposes of this article, art.
22 GDPR can be summarized as: DDCs may not make signifi-
cant decisions about consumers without some form of human
involvement. 
Since art. 22 GDPR is framed as an individual right, it does
not make any pronouncement on the profiling of groups.92
This poorly reflects current DDC practice, however, as pro-
filing algorithms are programmed specifically to first define
groups of similar people, which are assumed to stay the same
over time, and subsequently place new individuals into these
groups.93 While the decision to place an individual in a certain
group based on her analyzed behavior would be covered by art.
22 GDPR, the underlying decisions identifying specific groups
and assigning characteristics to them are not caught. This will
make it difficult for data subjects to challenge base assump-
tions of the decision-making process. Has the algorithm accu-
rately defined the groups in which it is categorizing individual
users, and are the attributes it has assigned to its groups fair?
The more challenging and fundamental question regard-
ing art. 22 GDPR, however, is exactly when decisions are suffi-
ciently significant to trigger its protection. First and foremost,
art. 22 GDPR covers those decisions which produce legal ef-
fects for the data subject, such as when a municipality takes
a decision on whether or not to grant government benefits to
a person.94 However, the more challenging and the more rel-
evant element is that decisions which do not strictly have a
legal effect, but still significantly affect the consumer in a sim-
ilar way, are also caught.95 An example of this could be thedening Gegevensbescherming in Europees En Nederlands Perspectief 
(Wolters Kluwer 2018), p. 220. 
91 Denis Kelleher and Karen Murray, EU Data Protection Law 
(Bloomsbury Professional 2018), p. 224.; Article 29 Working Party, 
‘Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profil- 
ing for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679’ (n 86), p. 19 – 20. 
92 Dimitra Kamarinou, Christopher Millard and Jatinder Singh (n 
84), p. 96 – 97. 
93 Toon Calders and Indr ̇e Žliobait ̇e, ‘Why Unbiased Computa- 
tional Processes Can Lead to Discriminative Decision Procedures’ 
in Bart Custers and others (eds), Discrimination and Privacy in the 
Information Society: Data Mining and Profiling in Large Databases 
(Springer 2013), p. 46.; Toon Calders and Bart Custers (n 46), p. 31 –
38. 
94 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Automated Individ- 
ual Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 
2016/679’ (n 86), p. 21. 
95 ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to 






























































































ecision on whether or not to grant insurance coverage to a 
erson.96 It is as of yet uncertain how broadly the term “simi- 
arly significantly affect” must be interpreted.97 The Article 29 
orking Party itself has struggled with this, offering the fol- 
owing rather circular explanation in its original draft of the 
uidelines on Automated Decision-making: “For data process- 
ng to significantly affect someone the effects of the processing must 
e more than trivial and must be sufficiently great or important to be 
orthy of attention.”98 The updated version of the Guidelines re- 
oves this phrasing and adds some useful examples, but still 
cknowledges that it is difficult to be precise about the scope 
f the term “significantly affects”.99 
This question is particularly relevant for automated 
ecision-making and profiling for targeted advertising pur- 
oses. For example, the decision whether to grant a loan is a 
ecision comparable to decisions having a legal effect,100 but 
oes art. 22 GDPR also cover asking a higher price from cer- 
ain individuals as compared to others, or the decision not to 
how certain advertisements or job offers to specific groups 
f people? Insurance companies could decide not to advertise 
o people whose interest profiles include motocross or mixed 
artial arts. In this scenario, the ability of those consumers to 
et insured hypothetically remains as is, but they will not be 
ffered the same discounts, effectively charging them a higher 
rice, or they may not be alerted to some products at all. If 
uch an outcome is the result of the advertising algorithms,
hey have still been subjected to automated decision-making 
hich affects them and their ability to choose insurers. The 
rticle 29 Working Party also envisions a number of scenar- 
os in which targeted advertising may lead to a significant ef- 
ect on the data subject. Factors could be the intrusiveness of 
he profiling activities, the ways in which the ads are deliv- 
red, exploiting known vulnerabilities of a person, or raising 
he pricing for certain individuals to a point where it becomes 
rohibitive.101 Nevertheless, the precise point where typical 
argeted advertising becomes a decision based solely on au- 
omated profiling, significantly affecting the data subject in a 
anner comparable to a decision having legal effect, remains 
nclear. he Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
ata’ (n 2), art. 22; Kranenborg and Verhey (n 90), p. 220. 
96 Arnoud Engelfriet, Lisette Meij and Peter Kager (n 78), p. 106 –
07. 
97 Dimitra Kamarinou, Christopher Millard and Jatinder Singh (n 
4), p. 99; Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Automated In- 
ividual Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regu- 
ation 2016/679’ (n 86), p. 21 – 22. 
98 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Automated Individ- 
al Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regu- 
ation 2016/679’ < https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm? 
oc _ id=47742 > accessed 18 March 2019; via Kelleher and Murray 
n 91), p. 225. 
99 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Automated Individ- 
al Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 
016/679’ (n 86), p. 21 – 22. 
00 ibid. 
01 ibid., p. 22. While the Art. 29 Working Party does not explic- 
tly acknowledge this, it can be argued that using psychological 
rofiling techniques, such as those mentioned in Section 2.2 , may 
ncover psychological vulnerabilities of an individual, which can 






















While the above mainly addresses the use of personal pro- 
les for the purposes of targeted advertising under art. 22 
PDR, there remains within the GDPR another extremely fun- 
amental issue with personal profiles. Namely: their classi- 
cation. While the GDPR explicitly acknowledges that behav- 
oral profiles constitute personal data,102 it is not immediately 
lear at what point they will also belong to the special cate- 
ories of personal data of art. 9 GDPR. This provision offers 
pecial protection to data which reveals race, ethnicity, reli- 
ion, sexual orientation, health, and other equally sensitive 
ypes of data.103 It can be argued that sufficiently detailed per- 
onal profiles also encompass these types of data. For exam- 
le, search queries can reveal an individual’s health concerns 
r her need for medication. In addition, while photographs do 
ot automatically belong to the special categories, they can 
onetheless qualify as “biometric data” if they are being pro- 
essed through technical means for the purposes of identi- 
cation.104 Facial recognition data, for instance for the pur- 
oses of recommending which friends to tag in a posted group 
hoto, could therefore qualify as biometric data.105 As such, it 
s highly probable that many DDCs already process a substan- 
ial amount of sensitive data protected under art. 9 GDPR, and 
hould therefore be conforming to the stricter set of rules the 
DPR demands. 
Even if the input data itself would not be protected as sensi- 
ive information, the inferences drawn from it during the pro- 
ling activities can lead to outputs which belong to the special 
ategories of art. 9 GDPR.106 Metadata alone can indicate calls 
ith a doctor or psychologist and an individual’s sexual orien- 
ation could be deduced from location data over time, brows- 
ng habits, and potentially from many more sources. The Arti- 
le 29 Working Party in its Guidelines on Automated Decision- 
aking cites a study, also referenced in note 57 above, in 
hich Facebook Likes were used to accurately predict sexual 
rientation, ethnicity, religion, and personality traits.107 While 
uman beings may not be able to make these connections at 
rst glance, if sufficiently advanced algorithms use such data 
s inputs they will be able to make highly accurate determi- 
ations. 
However, the GDPR does not answer the question of when 
 behavioral or interest profile becomes accurate and specific 02 ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of 
he Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to 
he Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
ata’ (n 2). Art. 4(1). 
03 ibid., art. 9. 
04 European Data Protection Board, ‘Guidelines 3/2019 on 
rocessing of Personal Data through Video Devices’ < https: 
/edpb.europa.eu/our- work- tools/public- consultations/2019/ 
uidelines- 32019- processing- personal- data- through- video _ en > 
ccessed 6 November 2019., p. 15 – 16. ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/679 
f the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection 
f Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
nd on the Free Movement of Such Data’ (n 2), Recital 51. 
05 European Data Protection Board (n 104), p. 17. 
06 Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale, ‘Slave to the Algorithm: Why 
 Right to an Explanation Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are 
ooking For’ [2017] Duke Law & Technology Review 18, p. 37. 
07 Kosinski, Stillwell and Graepel (n 57); via Article 29 Working 
arty, ‘Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and 
rofiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679’ (n 86), p. 15. 













































































113 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Article 29 Working Party 
Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679’ < https: 
//ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/document.cfm?action= 
display&doc _ id=51025 > accessed 6 March 2019, p. 13. 
114 Eleni Kosta, Consent in European Data Protection Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2013), p. 203.; Article 29 Working Party, ‘Article 29 enough to warrant it being caught by art. 9 GDPR. It is not easy
to determine how much certainty an algorithm provides that
a profile includes data from the special categories at all.108
Nor is there a settled rule on which level of certainty that the
profile includes data from the special categories is required to
trigger art. 9 GDPR’s protection. Does art. 9 GDPR cover profiles
which proclaim a 55% chance that the data subject is Muslim,
or a 90% chance that they are Caucasian, or a 30% chance that
they are transgender? While it is not clear which of these sit-
uations are caught by art. 9 GDPR, if any, these data points are
nonetheless highly sensitive and core to the identity of the
data subject in question. As a result of the uncertainty on the
status of detailed personal profiles, it is likely that many user
profiles maintained by DDCs contain such sensitive informa-
tion, yet are not being subjected to the stricter regime that the
GDPR prescribes. 
Ultimately, while the GPDR contains a number of provi-
sions aimed at shielding the consumer from the effects of in-
formation asymmetries that are inherent in profiling, there
are still significant gaps in its protection of EU citizens’ rights.
This leads to a situation in which DDCs use personal data to
make decisions with varying degrees of significance about the
individual consumer while the information asymmetries keep
the inner workings of the decision-making process opaque.
The GDPR does not currently provide an adequate solution to
these issues, as there are still too many uncertainties about
the exact extent to which it covers such practices. Conse-
quently, substantial information asymmetries as a result of
data analysis and profiling practices still remain. 
3.3. Consent and purpose 
Finally, the existence of information asymmetries raises ques-
tions about consent, which is a cornerstone of EU data protec-
tion law and the primary legal ground for data processing on
the data-driven market.109 Art. 4(11) GDPR defines consent as
a “freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous” indica-
tion that the data subject agrees with the processing of her or
his personal data.110 
The most apparent problem with the use of consent as a
legal ground for personal data processing by DDCs is that the
GDPR requires informed consent.111 Placing a cookie also re-
quires the data subject to be informed and be given the pos-
sibility to refuse.112 In order for consent to be properly “in-08 See note 49 and accompanying text. 
09 ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data’ (n 2), art. 6(1)a. 
10 Art. 7 GDPR mandates a number of additional requirements for 
the consent to be validly given. The request for consent for data 
processing must be clearly distinguished from other matters, such 
as a contract more generally, the terms of services, or the EULA. 
11 While it is possible to rely on different legal grounds as well, in 
practice consent can be expected to remain the most important. 
12 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data 
and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications 









formed”, the Article 29 Working Party lists a number of es-
sential elements: the data controller’s identity, the purpose of
the processing, what (type of) data will be collected, the right
to withdraw consent, the use of automated decision-making,
and possibility of data transfers.113 However, the core princi-
ple of informed consent goes beyond simply requiring a list of
raw information: the data subject must know and understand
what they are agreeing to.114 
It is this latter aspect that is especially problematic on the
data-driven market. Merely showing the privacy policy and
asking the user to click “I agree” is not sufficient to meet
the legal standards of informed consent.115 Given how much
working knowledge the consumer lacks about the process-
ing activities, from the data collection and analysis stage to
the steps connecting her activity to the ads she is served,
this would be deeply unjust. Nevertheless, this has proven
to be a long-standing difficulty. In 2013 Google was repri-
manded by the Dutch Data Protection Authority for spread-
ing out essential information across different web pages and
for using vague terminology when describing its processing
activities.116 Google therefore could not legally use informed
consent as its grounds for processing, as data subjects could
not “determine the nature and scope of the processing ac-
tivities”.117 In order for consent to be valid, DDCs will thus
have to walk the fine line between not sufficiently inform-
ing their users on the one hand, and providing them with
clear and intelligible information using plain language on the
other.118 
While it may be difficult for DDCs to ensure valid informed
consent, it is at least equally problematic to obtain “specific”
consent.119 This condition is closely related to the principle of
purpose limitation, which requires that any data shall only be
collected for specified purposes and not processed in a man-
ner that is incompatible with those purposes.120 Each individ-
ual purpose must be defined in advance and consent must
be asked on an opt-in basis for each separate data processing
purpose.121 Working Party Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679’ 
(n 113), p. 13. 
15 Roger Taylor, ‘No Privacy without Transparency’ in Ronald 
Leenes, Rosamunde Van Brakel and Serge Gutwirth (eds), Data pro- 
tection and privacy: the age of intelligent machines (Hart Publishing 
2017), p. 74. 
16 ‘Onderzoek CBP Naar Het Combineren van Persoonsgegevens 
Door Google’ (n 7), p. 68 – 70, 
17 ibid., p. 86. “[betrokkenen kunnen] geen inschatting maken van 
de aard en omvang van de gegevensverwerking”. 
18 ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data’ (n 2); Compare arts. 12 and 13 – 14. 
19 ibid., art. 4(11). 
20 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Article 29 Working Party Guidelines 
on Consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 113), p. 12. 
21 ibid. 








































































































Due to the nature of behavioral targeting, however, it is 
nherently impossible to establish ex ante what data will be 
ollected and what processing activities will take place. After 
ll, the intention is to observe whatever the user’s online ac- 
ivity is and will be, and adjust advertisements accordingly.122 
t is comparatively simple to establish informed consent if a 
upermarket asks for a person’s age for a loyalty card system: 
he company knows exactly what information it intends to 
ollect, and it can claim a well-defined purpose for doing so.
or instance, to establish whether the consumer is old enough 
o use the loyalty card to buy alcohol. With behavioral pro- 
les it is clear that a user’s activity will be used to establish 
n interest profile, target advertisements, and potentially im- 
rove the service, but there are also still many unknowns.
hat will the activity data actually show; how sensitive will 
his information be; what conclusions will the algorithms for 
ata analysis reach; how will these be incorporated into their 
nterest profiles; how will that profile be used for the advertis- 
ng in particular? These questions are difficult to answer pre- 
isely because the processing activities employed on the data- 
riven market do not have a set end goal. Nor does it have 
 predefined hypothesis for which it only collects a statisti- 
ally significant sample.123 Instead, the objective is to find as 
any correlations as possible, to establish as many interests 
s possible, and to do so with as great a level of detail as pos-
ible. Self-learning data analysis algorithms are built exactly 
or finding correlations between data points and using that 
orking knowledge to categorize individuals into whichever 
roups are deemed relevant.124 
It is difficult to reconcile this process with the requirement 
f specific consent or purpose limitation.125 Even discounting 
he fact that many people are not aware that such process- 
ng is taking place, it is unlikely that they would agree to all of 
his data collection from now until an undefined point in the 
uture. Nevertheless, DDCs still rely on consent as their pri- 
ary legal ground for the processing of data.126 This is pos- 
ible because the GDPR still places a large part of the respon- 
ibility to be informed, and to give informed consent, on the 
onsumers themselves. Once the data controller has met its 
nformation obligations, it is the consumer who has to ensure 
hat she accumulates, reads, and comprehends all of it. How- 
ver, the scope of the DDCs’ data processing is so broad and 
he information asymmetries so damaging to the consumers’ 
easonable understanding of the processing activities that the 
tandards of informed and specific consent are almost impos- 
ible to meet in this context. This has led Edwards and Veale 
o refer to consent as a “debased currency” which can increas- 
ngly be seen as meaningless or illusory.127 
Ultimately, while the consent requirements of the GDPR are 
till useful and workable in many different areas, one would 
e hard pressed to argue that consent on the data-driven 
arket is functional for ensuring a high standard of data 
rotection. 22 J. Gerards and R. Nehmelman (n 32), p. 15 – 18. 
23 Edwards and Veale (n 106), p. 32. 
24 J. Gerards and R. Nehmelman (n 32), p. 18 – 19. 
25 Eleni Kosta (n 114), p. 221. 
26 Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius (n 12), p. 201 – 203. 







. The limits of transparency in combating 
nformation asymmetries on the data-driven 
arket 
he above Sections outlined the myriad ways in which in- 
ormation asymmetries arise and to what extent they re- 
ain even after the EU intervention of the GDPR. The infor- 
ation asymmetries which arise on the data-driven market 
aise a number of particular concerns in terms of privacy and 
ata protection. This Section will focus on the issue of trans- 
arency and how it is integrally connected to the existing in- 
ormation asymmetries. The finding that consumers lack in- 
ormation about the data processing activities to which they 
re subject might lead one to conclude that increasing trans- 
arency is the way forward. However, this Section will detail 
he limits of what transparency can achieve in mitigating in- 
ormation asymmetry. In contrast to many other markets, on 
he data-driven market specifically there is little to gain from 
ncreasing consumer information in itself. 
.1. Transparency on the data-driven market: a different 
east 
he primary consequence of information asymmetries be- 
ween consumers and companies is a pointed lack of trans- 
arency. Yet there is a world of difference in how much trans- 
arency can be provided by regular companies with narrow 
ata processing goals and activities, or by DDCs whose busi- 
ess models revolve entirely on the monetization of personal 
ata. 
It is submitted that in relation to many conventional com- 
anies, the requirements of the GDPR are reasonably attain- 
ble and doing so goes a long way to fulfilling the “high level 
f [data] protection” it aims to ensure.128 “Conventional com- 
anies” here meaning those actors which are not fundamen- 
ally driven by the collection, analysis and monetization of 
ersonal data, and thus bearing fewer information asymme- 
ries. In particular, the data processing activities that typically 
ake place over the course of a traditional consumer-company 
elationship are much more limited in scope, are more focused 
n a clearly identified goal, and do not typically require de- 
ailed profiling. 
As a straightforward example, consumers buying products 
t online stores generally face far fewer information asymme- 
ries or other accompanying issues under the GDPR. A small 
pecialized webshop, for the purposes of closing a contract 
ith a customer, naturally requires the costumer’s log-in cre- 
entials, e-mail address, bank information, a name, and a 
ailing address to send a package to. Additional data could 
ntail usage data such as previously purchased items, an al- 
ernate mailing address, loyalty card data, or data necessary 
or sending newsletters. Due to this comparatively limited us- 
ge of personal data, such a company could easily inform the 
onsumer about its data processing, postulate a valid pur- 28 ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of 
he Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to 
he Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
ata’ (n 2), Preamble 10, art. 1(2). 





















































































pose for it, and allow the user to exercise her rights where
necessary. To a lesser extent the same is true for hospitals,
schools, sports clubs, and government institutions. Although
each would likely present its own challenges, the data pro-
cessing that is required for these actors to function is limited
in scope and directed towards a specified end goal. This is a
fundamentally different modus operandi from DDCs and the
data-driven market. DDCs are different due to the ubiquitous
data collection, the complexity of data processing combined
with the use of advanced analysis algorithms, the incentive
for ever more data collection and more detailed analysis,129 
and deeply entangled interconnections.130 Even if the GDPR
were to be followed to the letter it is not justified to assume
that the average consumer can oversee this entire process, un-
derstand it, and effectively invoke his rights. 
The difficulties of ensuring transparency on the data-
driven market start at the first point of contact. Whereas with
a typical webstore a contract is only closed when a consumer
buys a product, in relation to a DDC’s online service, such as a
social media platform, they are effectively entering into a con-
tract with the service provider at the moment they subscribe.
In return for access to the social media platform or search en-
gine the consumer agrees to have his data collected and to be
shown targeted advertisements. However, the exact details of
the transaction between consumer and service provider can
easily get lost on the consumers in question. They could even
lose sight of the fact that it is a transaction at all. Yet given the
information asymmetries that can arise on the data-driven
market it is especially vital that the terms of the contract are
fully understood by both parties. 
The privacy policy is an essential component that deter-
mines the consumer’s position vis-à-vis the data-driven ser-
vice provider, and is the main means by which data controllers
aim to fulfill their obligations to inform pursuant to Arts. 13
and 14 GDPR. However, while research shows that European
consumers indicate some reluctance about sharing personal
information,131 and that one of their main concerns is the lack
of insight into the data processing activities,132 very few con-
sumers report reading privacy policies in full.133 Additionally,
privacy policies are generally poorly understood 134 and user
settings aimed at giving consumers more agency over their29 Junqué de Fortuny, Martens and Provost (n 38). 
30 Robbert J. van Eijk (n 37), p. 266 – 268. 
31 Sunil Patil and others, ‘Public Perception of Security and 
Privacy’ (2015) < https://www.rand.org/pubs/research _ reports/ 
RR704.html > accessed 21 February 2019, p. 17 – 23.; Au- 
toriteit Persoonsgegevens, ‘Nederland Maakt Zich Zor- 
gen over Privacy: Flitspeiling Privacyrechten’ < https: 
//autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ 
resultaten _ enquete _ privacyzorgen _ jan _ 2019.pdf> accessed 21 
February 2019. 
32 Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (n 131). 
33 Craig Dempster and John Lee, The Rise of the Platform 
Marketer: Performance Marketing with Google, Facebook, and 
Twitter, Plus the Latest High-Growth Digital Advertising Plat- 
forms (John Wiley & Sons 2015), p. 92; ‘Do Consumers Care 
About Online Privacy?’ < http://adage.com/article/digital/ 
consumers- care- online- privacy/121578/ > accessed 29 June 
2017. 
34 Dempster and Lee (n 133), p. 92; ‘Do Consumers Care About On- 











personal data are often difficult to find or even ineffective.135
For example, in 2018 it was reported that Google still collected
locational data even if the user had opted out of this feature.136
In the collection stage the consumer is inadequately in-
formed about the data that is being amassed and the pur-
poses underlying the collection. As was discussed in Section
2.1 , every action a user makes on a data-driven service can be
a data point for the service provider, even if said action is sim-
ply the ordinary use of the service. The greater transparency
problem, however, lies in the analysis stage. The creation of
profiles is almost entirely delegated to algorithms which are
often self-learning. Not only is the computer code involved in
the creation of an algorithm already of a high level of com-
plexity,137 the actual results they deliver are practically im-
possible to understand for human beings. This is because the
datasets which these algorithms analyze are both immense
and extraordinarily varied, and because the methods of ‘rea-
soning’ which algorithms employ are different from the de-
ductive reasoning human beings are familiar with.138 While
algorithms are able to analyze and systemize the input data
in order to reach a conclusion it will be almost impossible for
a human being to reverse-engineer the results.139 This will
prove especially true if the algorithm is frequently updated
by the DDC,140 and more still if it is self-learning: such algo-
rithms build on their own previous conclusions to enhance
the analysis.141 Additionally, algorithms can be connected to
other algorithms and work based on each other’s conclusions,
thereby considerably expanding the amount of inferences that
can be made.142 At this level of complexity not even IT experts
are able to comprehend these algorithms and their operating
procedures.143 It has been submitted that not even knowing
the source code and input data for these systems will be suf-
ficient to replicate and verify the results.144 
The immense complexity of both behavioral profiling algo-
rithms and the data-driven market as a whole brings about
a virtually insurmountable lack of transparency. Not only is
there an imbalance between the information that is available
to the DDC and the consumer, there also exist inherent fun-
damental difficulties that prevent consumers from being in-
formed about how their personal data is processed. Conse-
quently, consumers should be excused for failing to read pri-35 Compare the FTC’s complaints regarding Facebook’s options to 
prevent third parties from having access to personal data through 
one’s Facebook friends. United States of America v. Facebook, Inc. (n 
23), paras. 25, 40 – 42, 53 – 61. 
36 Ryan Nakashima, ‘AP Exclusive: Google Tracks Your Move- 
ments, like It or Not’ ( AP NEWS , 13 August 2018) < https://apnews. 
com/828aefab64d4411bac257a07c1af0ecb > accessed 21 February 
2019. 
37 J. Gerards and R. Nehmelman (n 32), p. 49. 
38 Dimitra Kamarinou, Christopher Millard and Jatinder Singh (n 
84), p. 106. 
39 J. Gerards and R. Nehmelman (n 32). 
40 Joshua A Kroll and others, ‘Accountable Algorithms’ 165 Uni- 
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review 74, p. 659 – 660. 
41 Dimitra Kamarinou, Christopher Millard and Jatinder Singh (n 
84), p. 106 – 107. 
42 Toon Calders and Bart Custers (n 46), p. 40. 
43 J. Gerards and R. Nehmelman (n 32), p. 49. 
44 Kroll and others (n 140); Dimitra Kamarinou, Christopher Mil- 
lard and Jatinder Singh (n 84), p. 107. 































































































147 Michael L Rich, ‘Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algo- 
rithms, and the Fourth Amendment’ (2016) 164 University of Penn- 
sylvania Law Review 871, p. 912. 
148 Robyn Burrows, ‘Judicial Confusion and the Digital Drug Dog 
Sniff: Pragmatic Solutions Permitting Warrantless Hashing of 
Known Illegal Files’ (2011) 19 George Mason Law Review, p. 280; 
Rich (n 147), p. 912. 
149 Rich (n 147), p. 911. 
150 Edwards and Veale (n 106), p. 25; Bayamlioglu (n 3), p. 441; Dim- 
itra Kamarinou, Christopher Millard and Jatinder Singh (n 84), p. acy policies or their inability to effectively investigate their 
nline data footprint. Due to the multitude of actors operat- 
ng on the targeted advertising market, all of the processing 
hat takes place, and the complexity of the analysis, identify- 
ng all of the relevant controllers, reading their respective pri- 
acy policies, and determining what they mean for one’s pri- 
acy in practice, would be a herculean task. Even if each DDC 
omposed their privacy policy as concisely, clearly and simply 
s the GDPR requires, few (if any) consumers would find the 
ime to read them all or be able to oversee the data flows they 
uthorize. 
This is deeply problematic, because transparency is an es- 
ential tool for consumers to exercise their rights and main- 
ain control and autonomy over their privacy.145 In fact, one 
ould go one step further still: transparency is necessary for a 
erson to know what their rights are in the first place. Trans- 
arency first and foremost serves as a safeguard. It allows data 
ubjects to know how their data is being processed and if nec- 
ssary to act upon it. Most of the rights granted to the data 
ubject in the GDPR presuppose that the consumers know 
hat personal data is being processed or at the very least 
now which are the relevant data controllers. Even taken to- 
ether the many rights intended to empower the data sub- 
ects will only be effective if data subjects are actually able 
o identify relevant data controllers, investigate the data pro- 
essing being performed, and ultimately control their online 
ersonal data footprint. However, the information asymme- 
ries with regards to DDCs are so substantial that not even this 
rerequisite can be fulfilled in practice. It will therefore be dif- 
cult for consumers to make informed decisions or to protect 
hemselves from excessive data collection, unwarranted shar- 
ng of data with third parties, and the potential consequences 
f profiling. 
.2. The explainability of behavioural targeting 
lgorithms 
xplainability could potentially be an important element of 
ncreasing transparency in behavioral profiling and reducing 
nformation asymmetries. To what extent can it be compre- 
ensibly explained to a consumer how a particular decision 
as reached, why she was classified as belonging to a cer- 
ain group, or why she is seeing different advertising from her 
riends? 
At present, it is considered very difficult to achieve func- 
ional explainability of behavioral profiling systems, for rea- 
ons already laid out in Section 4.1 : the complexity of the al- 
orithms, the volume and variety of the input data, the self- 
earning capabilities of the system once it is operational, and 
he fact that algorithmic reasoning does not directly translate 
o human thinking patterns.146 Rich vividly illustrates the lat- 
er point with an interesting analogy in which he compares 45 Tal Zarsky, ‘Transparency in Data Mining: From Theory to Prac- 
ice’ in Bart Custers and others (eds), Discrimination and Privacy in 
he Information Society: Data Mining and Profiling in Large Databases 
Springer 2013), p. 317 – 318. 
46 Dimitra Kamarinou, Christopher Millard and Jatinder Singh (n 









rofiling algorithms to police dogs trained to sniff out drugs.147 
e are all able to understand how a drug dog was trained,
hy a dog may make certain errors, and how error-prone dogs 
an be retrained for better accuracy.148 We even have a vague 
nderstanding of why an input (a specific scent) leads to an 
utput (alerting the officers), even though our human senses 
annot replicate it. However, the internal rules and thought 
rocesses which lead from input to output are unknown and 
ndeed unknowable. The animal’s “thought process” is impos- 
ible to capture in a human understanding of causation, rea- 
oning and logic.149 Much like these dogs, algorithms do not 
think” as a user might expect either.150 
Naturally, some important nuance should be added to this 
iew. In their highly constructive work “Playing with the Data ”
ehr and Ohm caution against the tendency of legal schol- 
rs to view algorithms as an impenetrable black box.151 They 
rge us to remember that algorithms do not drop out of the 
ky fully-formed, but are developed, trained, optimized, ad- 
usted, and evaluated by human beings in various different 
oles.152 Throughout that process complexities are introduced 
nd openings arise for bias to sneak into the system in various 
ays, but there are also opportunities for increasing explain- 
bility.153 Developers could opt for different models which al- 
ow for more transparency, at least if the likely loss of accuracy 
n doing so is deemed acceptable. Moreover, during the devel- 
pment stages programmers could research methods to chart 
ow the provided inputs relate to the final output, particu- 
arly by showing how strongly each inputs affect the output.154 
ince this is inefficient to do on a case-by-case basis other 
ethods have been employed: for example, plotting how indi- 
idual input variables affect the overall accuracy of the algo- 
ithm during the training phase.155 If certain variables intro- 
uce a significant decrease in accuracy, the algorithm may be 
isplaying some bias with regards to those variables. 
By employing these sorts of explainability tests during 
he development of a profiling algorithm, developers are able 
o oversee more clearly how the algorithm is operating and 
hether it is making obviously undesirable inferences based 
n the training data. They can try to discover weaknesses in 
he system and fix them before any resulting biases have con- 
equences during its operation in the real world. In some cases 
t can thus be a useful tool to track down bias or even discrim-06. 
51 David Lehr and Paul Ohm, ‘Playing with the Data: What Legal 
cholars Should Learn about Machine Learning’ [2017] U.C. Davis 
aw Review 653. 
52 ibid., p. 668. 
53 ibid., p. 692. 
54 ibid., p. 693, 709 – 710. 
55 ibid., p. 708. 


























































































inatory elements within an algorithm ex ante . That is, before
consumers, facing their information asymmetries and thus
unable to verify this for themselves, are made subject to it. 
However, the practical benefits of explainable algorithms
for the average consumer are limited, and whether it will
significantly improve consumers’ ability to understand the
decision-making process remains to be seen. Under the cur-
rent state of the art explainable AI is primarily useful in the
development, training, testing, and fine-tuning stages of algo-
rithms, where the researcher has full control of the system
under review.156 To developers with the correct tools, testing
the system by having it explain itself, followed by comparing
those explanations to the output, can help them make the al-
gorithm more robust, more accurate and less biased before us-
ing it in an operational setting. In contrast, end users are only
able to request an explanation ex post and have no insight into
these crucial developmental stages of the algorithm: they can
only work with the operational algorithm as is. 
More importantly, research into making AI output explain-
able to a lay-person is currently primarily focused on relatively
rudimentary decision-making processes rather than on ex-
tensive neural networks.157 For example, explainable AI can be
developed to provide insights into why an insurance request
was denied, why a person was hired over the other applicants,
or what factors determine whether a loan should be granted.
While these determinations are undoubtedly big in impact for
the addressee, especially if he suspects bias, the algorithm it-
self need not be as complex as those employed by DDCs. The
decision-making process is only focused on a single outcome
to be determined with little room for grey areas. Furthermore,
there are generally a limited number of predefined variables
that factor into the decision, which an explainable AI could
easily rank on importance. If the decision to deny a person car
insurance is based on age, gender, traffic violations committed
in the past, and drinking habits, a simple model showing the
relative relevance of each of these factors could be provided to
the consumer requesting the insurance. In doing so, it would
allow this person to challenge the decision on the substance,
including potential bias, (“Why did my gender account for 50%
of the algorithm’s final decision?”) or on the procedure (“How
did you obtain information about my drinking habits?”). 
While the benefits of such explanations should not be un-
derestimated, it must also be recognized that the added value
of explainable AI diminishes as the algorithm becomes more
complex. In particular, the algorithm diminishes in explain-
ability and transparency as more distinct variables are used to
make a determination, and as the algorithm is charged with
an unlimited amount of potential determinations to be put56 Seong Joon Oh, Bernt Schiele and Mario Fritz, ‘Towards Reverse- 
Engineering Black-Box Neural Networks’ in Wojciech Samek and 
others (eds), Explainable AI: Interpreting, Explaining and Visual- 
izing Deep Learning , vol 11700 (Springer International Publish- 
ing 2019) < http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978- 3- 030- 28954- 6 _ 
7 > accessed 13 November 2019, p. 123. 
57 Wojciech Samek and Klaus-Robert Müller, ‘Towards Explain- 
able Artificial Intelligence’ in Wojciech Samek and others (eds), 
Explainable AI: Interpreting, Explaining and Visualizing Deep Learning , 
vol 11700 (Springer International Publishing 2019), p. 16 – 17; Oh, 












into an interest profile.158 Here too a stark contrast can be seen
between DDCs and other companies whose business model
does not primarily revolve around the monetization of per-
sonal data. Since DDCs operate by collecting large volumes
of personal data and processing this to create behavioral pro-
files which may contain any number of different data points
and subsequent analytic findings, it currently remains pro-
hibitively difficult to build workable explainability measures
for the end-user into the algorithms being employed.159 As
such, the information asymmetries which are present in these
kinds of business models cannot simply be diminished by in-
corporating explainability instances, even if such measures
may be suitable for traditional companies and less complex
data processing. 
4.3. Transparency and bias 
The existence of information asymmetries and the lack of
transparency are also the base of associated concerns. The
most pressing of these is the potential for undisclosed bias
in the profiling and decision-making stages. In fact, potential
bias and lacking transparency are intrinsically linked. Because
of lacking transparency one cannot weed out all of the biases
in a system; yet because it is unclear to what extent an algo-
rithm contains biases at all, transparency itself becomes im-
possible to fully realize.160 
Due to the essential role that personal data collection and
analysis plays in the data-driven business model, the service
providers have a strong incentive to increase their data col-
lection and improve their analysis. However, it is not only the
volume of personal data collection and analysis that is cause
for concern. It is equally important to examine the methods
by which algorithms reach their conclusion. Doing so reveals
a fundamental concern of data analysis: algorithms use the
information of past group dynamics to predict present indi-
vidual behavior. A person’s likely interests and behavior are
determined primarily by looking at what other people simi-
lar to her have already shown to have done previously.161 In
effect, the DDC is not setting up profiles to be the most fair
and accurate representation of an individual.162 Instead, pro-
filing is aimed at creating a caricature of an individual for the
primary purpose of effective targeted advertising. Superficial
attributes are magnified, compared to the attributes of other
people, and used to draw conclusions about an individual per-
son. Profiling algorithms are thus inherently intended to dif-
ferentiate between people.163 As an additional result of how
algorithms reach their conclusions, personal profiles are in-
herently skewed towards reinforcing former behavior, espe-
cially when they are used for advertising purposes.164 
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that data analysis
can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies and discrimination.165 In58 Samek and Müller (n 157), p. 6. 
59 ibid., p. 16 – 17. 
60 Bayamlioglu (n 3), p. 437. 
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ome cases, DDCs have actively allowed targeting based on 
iscriminatory characteristics: up until recently Facebook al- 
owed advertisers to exclude specific races or genders from 
eeing their ads even if these ads were related to housing, jobs,
r credit.166 More often, however, biases become entrenched 
n the algorithm without any overt malicious intent, which 
onetheless causes the algorithm itself to end up discrimi- 
atory.167 At a certain level of complexity it simply becomes 
oo difficult to assess exactly which groups the algorithm has 
dentified or what traits it associates with them. For example,
f the programmers behind an advertising algorithm even sub- 
onsciously believe ‘leadership’ to be a predominantly mascu- 
ine trait, it is possible that women searching for new employ- 
ent will eventually receive different ads than men.168 Pre- 
ious discrimination or biased training data could influence 
he output as well. For instance, facial recognition software 
as had difficulties distinguishing the faces of people of color 
ainly because Caucasian people have been overrepresented 
n the training data,169 and similar situations can occur in pro- 
ling for targeted advertising purposes.170 If few women have 
reviously been hired for certain jobs, algorithms might not be 
ble to accurately assess which job opportunities to advertise 
o them.171 Women being hired at lower rates than men could 
ead a profiling system to conclude that men are more suitable 
or the position since, after all, more men have successfully 
eld that position in the past.172 In that scenario, historical 
nstances of discrimination would be used as a basis for cur- 
ent discriminatory decisions. Even in a hypothetical scenario 66 Noam Scheiber and Mike Isaac, ‘Facebook Halts Ad Tar- 
eting Cited in Bias Complaints’ The New York Times (20 
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n which the algorithm was written completely neutrally, its 
elf-learning capabilities could therefore still lead it to dis- 
riminatory results on the basis of the input it receives.173 
oreover, as such inferences make their way into the algo- 
ithm’s database it will also continue to propagate and sys- 
emize them: 174 from that moment on it will adjust a user’s 
nline experiences based on the ‘knowledge’ it has gained. 
Throughout this entire process consumers are often un- 
ware that such processes are taking place behind the services 
hat they are using for free. Here the lacking transparency 
nd information asymmetries thus cause the greatest con- 
erns. DDCs make automated decisions on their users with 
otentially far-reaching consequences without a counteract- 
ng power on the consumer’s part to monitor or exercise an 
ffective check on this process. Consumers do see the results 
f data analysis in the form of targeted ads, but they cannot 
now how the algorithms came to these results or on the basis 
f what specific data. It is not clear whether an individual was 
rofiled in a certain manner because of their own character- 
stics, or because they are part of a group which the algorithm 
as defined. Even if bias does exist within the system, it does 
ot necessarily mean that it will affect the final outcome: the 
ias could only be a negligible factor in the final decision, or 
t could be balanced out by counterweighing biases.175 Conse- 
uently, it is practically impossible to determine whether or to 
hat extent bias was a factor in the decision-making process 
r profiling output. 
Indeed, it can be difficult to determine whether any singu- 
ar data point is even truly “neutral” or is actually a proxy for 
eing a member of a minority.176 A straightforward example 
s address data. On the surface, a person’s address is a neu- 
ral data point, since in itself it does not reveal anything about 
he person who lives there. Nevertheless, combined with other 
ata, such as income levels in the area or the percentage of 
inority inhabitants of the street, it could reveal potentially 
ensitive and protected data. While it is theoretically possible 
o painstakingly remove all such proxies from the system dur- 
ng the training and finetuning phases, this will also greatly 
iminish the algorithm’s accuracy.177 Consequently, a balanc- 
ng exercise will have to be performed between mitigating po- 
ential bias at the cost of accuracy, or a more accurate model 
hat comes with the added uncertainty of not knowing which 
iases have been embedded in the system. 
The aggravating factor in the data analysis stage is that 
DCs do not require the consumer’s continuous cooperation 
n order to analyze their data. Provided some data has already 
een collected and there is sufficient information collected 
rom other users, algorithms can be used to infer new data in 
rder to enhance the user’s behavioral profile. Consequently,
he only actual protection against data analysis that the con- 
umer can effect is to limit the amount of data that is col-
ected in the first instance. As was discussed in Section 2 , the73 Toon Calders and Indr ̇e Žliobait ̇e (n 93), p. 50 – 53; J. Gerards and 
. Nehmelman (n 32), p. 142 – 143. 
74 Kroll and others (n 140), p. 680. 
75 Bayamlioglu (n 3), p. 437. 
76 Barocas and Selbst (n 167), p. 720 – 721. 
77 ibid., p. 721. 





































































































data-driven market makes this very challenging for the aver-
age consumer. 
In essence, the issues of potential discrimination, informa-
tion asymmetries and lacking transparency therefore go hand
in hand. If the system is insufficiently transparent for users or
third parties to scrutinize, biases in the system can go unad-
dressed and decisions continue to be made on an unjust basis.
On the other hand, the knowledge that biases are effectively
an inevitable factor in any profiling algorithm makes it diffi-
cult to dissect how a decision was reached. Without functional
oversight and a check on this decision-making power the
data-driven market and the principle of non-discrimination
can thus be difficult to reconcile. 
Moreover, while transparency and bias are intrinsically
linked, transparency in itself is not a suitable remedy for bias,
if it is even possible to achieve. As Edwards and Veale observe,
ex post transparency is not a suitable remedy in cases of actual
algorithmic discrimination.178 Certainly, making the decision
more explainable can help developers root out the problem-
atic training data or fine-tune the program itself by removing
harmful inferences. Yet to those being discriminated against
an explanation of why a discriminatory decision was made is
not satisfactory: they wanted the discrimination to never have
occurred.179 
Ultimately, regardless of any transparency measures, the
tension between behavioral profiling and non-discrimination
will remain, especially as they are exacerbated by infor-
mation asymmetries and lacking transparency. Indeed, the
data-driven business model quintessentially revolves around
finding and exploiting any differences between individuals,
whereas the principle of non-discrimination is founded on the
notion that certain differences between human beings should
be expressly ignored.180 
5. Conclusion 
It must be concluded that the many information asymmetries
which exist between consumers and data-driven companies
on the online data-driven market are a serious concern, and
the General Data Protection Regulation is not able to mitigate
them to an appreciable extent. An inherent consequence of
these information asymmetries is that transparency in the
DDCs’ business model remains lacking, and indeed may effec-
tively not be possible at all. This is deeply concerning on the
data-driven market especially, because information asymme-
tries on this market primarily involve the processing of per-
sonal data. They thus affect consumers’ data protection rights
and their ability to make informed decisions about their on-
line privacy. 
Information asymmetries between consumers and data-
driven companies arise on a number of online markets due
to a business model based on both collecting extensive per-
sonal data and then analyzing it for the best possible tar-
geting of advertising. These information asymmetries are the78 Edwards and Veale (n 106), p. 42. 
79 ibid. 






cause of a number of critical problems, most notably a lack
of transparency and, integrally connected to that, a poten-
tial for undisclosed bias. As such, information asymmetries
can threaten the privacy and data protection of EU citizens
since companies, effectively unilaterally, collect information
and make automated decisions about individuals. Meanwhile,
there is no effective countervailing consumer power to act as
a check on such practices. Moreover, these issues are unavoid-
able in a market which is based on the large-scale collection
and monetization of personal data. 
The General Data Protection Regulation does offer a num-
ber of rights and obligations to mitigate these issues, but in
practice many gaps in its coverage remain. To a large extent
this can be attributed to unclear terminology and a lack of
interpretational guidance in applying the relevant GDPR pro-
visions to DDCs. More importantly, the lack of transparency
on the data-driven market, caused by the volume and variety
of data collection as well as the extensive use of complex al-
gorithms, is a major detriment to the effective enforcement
of data protection law. Due to insurmountable information
asymmetries citizens often do not even have sufficient infor-
mation to know their privacy has been infringed, or by whom,
let alone to invoke their data protection rights. 
It is also essential to recognize the fundamental differ-
ences between DDCs and conventional companies in this re-
gard. Whereas the latter companies typically only require a
limited amount of data, for a delineated purpose, and with-
out profound use of detailed profiling, DDCs operate wholly
on the collection and analysis of personal data. In doing so,
they generate far greater information asymmetries than the
consumer will be able to overcome even with the aid of the
rights granted by the GDPR. The distinction between DDCs and
other companies even affects the extent to which the algo-
rithms being employed can be (re)designed for explainability.
Under the current state of the art, algorithms being used for
rudimentary decision-making can be made to explain their
decision-making process and the way different data points
factor into the outcome. However, this will be practically im-
possible for complex self-learning profiling systems designed
to find as much information about a person’s behavior as
possible. 
Following this reasoning to its logical conclusion, a vital
question presents itself. Namely, is the data-driven business
model fundamentally incompatible with the GDPR? In other
words: does the GDPR prohibit an entire market? 
Under the current state of the law this seems doubtful.
While the GDPR certainly does require the consumer to be in-
formed in a number of ways, such as through arts. 12 – 15 or
when relying on informed consent, a substantial portion of
the responsibility for being informed still falls upon the con-
sumers themselves. In particular the GDPR’s focus on trans-
parency and data subject rights effectively puts the onus of
acting on the consumer. Consumers themselves are made re-
sponsible for gathering information, reading and understand-
ing privacy policies, investigating the data processing activi-
ties to which they are exposed, and finally exercising the ap-
plicable rights. As this article has shown, it is not realistic to
require this level of investment from the consumer with re-
gards to DDCs, given the deep-rooted information asymme-
tries they would have to overcome. Furthermore, even if con-







































umers were to succeed in informing themselves about one 
DCs data processing activities, it is virtually impossible to 
o so for every single DDC they encounter online. In short, the 
DPR is equipped for making data controllers provide blan- 
et information, but does not seem equipped for situations in 
hich providing all this information still does not ensure de 
acto transparency for the consumer. 
To tackle this problem the balance between DDCs and con- 
umers would have to shift, placing less of the burden on the 
onsumers than is currently the case. The GDPR would need to 
e substantially updated to more effectively account for DDCs 
nd their unique characteristics as compared to conventional 
ompanies. The current online reality has already outpaced 
he reality which the GDPR appears to have been written for.
he GDPR may indeed have already been lacking in this re- 
pect before it was even adopted. Regardless, merely applying 
he GDPR as it currently is will not be sufficient to protect the 
rivacy of citizens against the many actors which exploit a 
ata-driven business model. 
Broad solutions to this issue will therefore have to be found 
hich fully appreciate the inequality between consumers and 
ata-driven companies that is a result of the information 
symmetries which are inherent in the data-driven market.pgrading the GDPR itself would certainly be a worthwhile 
ndeavor, but more research is also required into the regu- 
ation of data-driven companies beyond the borders of data 
rotection law alone. As the German Bundeskartellamt has al- 
eady discerned, there is considerable potential in areas such 
s competition law and consumer protection law to constrain 
he data processing activities of dominant data-driven com- 
anies beyond what the General Data Protection Regulation 
an achieve on its own. 
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